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The  pendulum  effect  of  regulation:  How  the  policy  swing  between  the  over  and  
under  regulation  of  financial  institutions  will  be  ineffective  and  detrimental  to  
business. 
 
 
Regulation,  the  one  constant  of  the  financial  system,  since  the  beginnings  of  the  industry  in  coffee  
houses  with  gentleman's  agreements,  to  the  harshly  regulated  times  we  have  seen  since  the  
financial  crash  of  2008.  Whichever  pole  the  pendulum  swings  to,  it  is  clear  that  it  has  little  impact  
on  the  behaviour  of  those  who  work  within  our  most  valued  financial  institutions.  Before  we  can  
discuss  the  merits  to  regulation  and  the  success  of  either  a  harsh  or  lax  approach,  we  must  
understand  how  the  greatest  financial  collapse  in  living  memory  happened.   
 
The  cause  of  the  financial  crash  has  been  put  down,  by  many,  to  the  collapse  of  the  American  
bank  Lehman  Brothers  on  15th  September  2008.  This  is  seen  as  the  tipping  point  of  the  crash  as  
the  United  States  Government  chose  not  to  save  the  bank  and  allowed  one  of  its  oldest  and  most  
respected  institutions  to  declare  bankruptcy.  For  the  public  this  became  car  crash  viewing  as  they  
could  not  believe  this  institution  had  fallen  out  of  seemingly  nowhere.  However  for  those  within  the  
industry  the  collapse  of  the  global  financial  system  had  begun  well  over  a  year  before  as  both  
Bear  Sterns and  German  bank  IKB  revealed  the  detriment  that  subprime  mortgages  had  become.  In  
the  summer  of  2007  IKB  had  collapsed  and  Bear  Sterns  had  to  bail  out  one  of  its  hedge  funds  
due  to  a  funding  crisis  caused  by  investment  in  subprime  mortgages.  For  those  in  the  industry  it  
became  clear  that  these  products,  which  had  been  marketed  as  AAA  rated  investments  by  all  three  
top  ratings  agencies,  were  not  the  safe  bet  that  they  had  seemed.  It  is  clear  that  the  crash  had  
not  been  brought  on  by  a  single  event,  but  by  the  collapse  of  the  subprime  mortgage  lending  
market.  The  fall  of  Lehman  Brothers  was  just  the  event  which  caused  the  bubble  to  burst.   
 
Bubbles  are  incredibly  common  in  the  financial  markets,  they  come  and  go  without  being  noticed  by  
anyone  outside  of  the  markets  concerned.  These  can  be  relatively  minor  or  have  a  much  larger  
impact  such  as  the  South  Sea  bubble.  The  anatomy  of  a  bubble  is  the  same  no  matter  what  part  
of  the  financial  industry  is  involved.  The  beginning  of  a  bubble  has  been  referred  to  by  Hyman  
Minsky  as  displacement1,  this  relates  to  a  change  in  circumstances  within  the  economy,  creating  a  
new  opportunity,  which  the  financial  industry  considers  to  be  profitable.  The  second  stage  of  a  
bubble  occurs  through  expansion,  as  the  price  begins  to  rise,  the  opportunity  becomes  more  visible  
meaning  that  more  individuals  become  involved.  This  leads  on  to  the  third  stage,  which  is  euphoria,  
this  occurs  when  the  asset  becomes  overtraded,  meaning  that  the  price  rises  rapidly  and  becomes  
so  large  that  the  creator  of  the  asset  cannot  justify  its  rise  in  value.  The  exceptional  rise  in  price  
leads  industry  outsiders  becoming  involved  as  they  see  an  opportunity  to  create  large  scale  wealth  
quickly.  The  bubbles  feed  into  human  nature,  as  they  seem  to  suggest  that  anyone  can  ‘get  rich  
quick’,  an  investor  doesn't  need  any  substantial  knowledge  in  the  area,  they  can  purely  follow  the  
decisions  of  others  and  get  out  before  it  is  to  late.  The  penultimate  phase  of  a  bubble  is  the  
                                                 
1 H. Minsky, ‘Financial Instability Revisited: the Economics of Disaster’, Washington: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve 
System, January 1970  
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distress  phase,  in  which  insiders  to  the  industry  begin  to  see  that  the  rise  in  the  price  is  against  
the  fundamentals  of  the  financial  system  and  therefore  cannot  be  maintained.  At  this  stage  it  is  not  
yet  the  case  that  the  tide  begins  to  turn.  Those  with  an  interest  in  seeing  the  asset  flourish  will    
continue  to  entice  others  into  the  market  with  the  idea  that  they  can  make  money  quickly.  The  final  
stage  of  Minsky’s  bubble  anatomy  is  the  revulsion  phase  as  insiders  leave  the  market  with  their  
profits,  leaving  those  outsiders  who  have  been  enticed  into  the  market  to  try  and  minimise  their  
loses.  As  these  investors  start  to  see  the  risk  which  they  had  previously  been  blind  to,  the  asset  
loses  it’s  value  drastically,  especially  as  there  are  now  no  new  buyers  entering  the  market,  leading  
to  a  crash.  These  bubbles  are  nothing  new,  as  industries  take  off  and  fail  regularly,  which  was  the  
case  with  the  subprime  mortgage  bubble.  Like  all  bubbles  as  long  as  people  continued  to  pay  off  
their  mortgages  there  was  nothing  to  be  concerned  about,  however  this  did  not  happen  as  the  rate  
of  default  on  these  subprime  loans  reached  21.9  percent  for  loans  in  20072.  Meaning  that  the  
industry  could  not  maintain  itself,  with  assets  losing  value  and  the  institutions  who  had  invested  in  
them  suffering  a  funding  crisis,  leading  to  the  bursting  of  this  particular  bubble  in  2007. 
 
They  have  come  to  see  these  new  products  as  their  main  source  of  creating  profit,  with  the  
industry  manufacturing  an  image  of  complex  products  which  only  they  can  understand,  meaning  that  
their  services  in  trading  them  is  required,  as  no  ordinary  retail  investor,  could  adequately  assess  
their  value.  Since  the  financial  crash  we  can  see  that  in  reality  these  institutions  had  no  advanced  
knowledge  on  these  subjects  and  trusted  the  computer  calculations  which  they  had  come  to  rely  
upon  at  the  time.  Even  the  ratings  agencies  used  the  same  calculations  as  the  banks,  so  there  
were  no  adequate  checks  on  the  value  of  these  assets  and  could  be  valued  at  will,  creating  even  
more  value  for  the  bubble  to  grow.  Many  within  the  industry  had  no  concern  for  such  things  as  
there  was  a  shared  belief  between  all  institutions,  that  no  matter  what  the  financial  system  would  
survive.  Since  2007,  this  has  now  proved  to  be  false  with  many  not  knowing  how  to  react  to  the  
core  beliefs  being  shattered.   
 
Whilst  bubbles  are  considered  to  be  a  mainstay  of  the  finical  system  it  is  hard  to  see  why  this  is  
the  case  and  why  they  haven't  been  regulated  against.  To  look  at  the  anatomy  of  a  bubble  is  to  
see  numerous  similarities  to  a  Ponzi  scheme,  as  ‘a  Ponzi  scheme  is  an  investment  fraud  that  uses  
funds  raised  from  new  investors  to  create  returns  for  earlier  investors.  Investors  are  often  lured  by  
the  prospect  of  high  rates  of  return  with  little  or  no  risk…  The  scheme  collapses  when  no  new  
investors  can  be  found  or  when  earlier  investors  try  to  withdraw  their  principal  investment.  Most  
investors  lose  their  money’3.  Quite  rightly  Ponzi  schemes  are  illegal  and  heavily  punished,  this  can  
be  seen  in  the  handling  of  Merrill  Lynch’s  involvement  in  the  Enron  scandal,  by  the  United  States  
Securities  and  Exchange  Commission4.  Yet  bubbles  go  unregulated  and  are  allowed  to  flourish  and  
collapse  without  regulatory  intervention,  it  seems  that  this  is  the  case  due  to  the  lack  of  impact  the  
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Chicago Reserve Bank, QII 2009 
3 Fraud Advisory Panel, ‘Fraud Facts’, Issue 7, December 2010 
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majority  of  bubbles  have.  Any  losses  that  are  suffered  are  not  seen  as  a  fraudulent  activity  but  as  
a  poor  investment  decision  with  the  loss  seen  as  collateral  damage.  However  it  could  be  said  that  
there  may  be  an  added  element  of  intent  to  defraud,  as  there  is  little  difference  between  a  person  
luring  another  into  a  particular  scheme  and  a  person  luring  another  into  investing  in  a  particular  
asset,  especially  if  they  are  to  gain  financially  from  that  investment.  This  should  especially  be  
considered  the  case  when  it  comes  to  a  debt  bubble,  as  with  a  debt  bubble  it  is  not  just  those  
involved  that  stand  to  lose,  but  society  as  a  whole.     
 
It  is  very  much  the  case  that  these  bubbles  should  be  regulated  although  it  is  clear  that  they  
cannot  be,  as  their  very  origin  is  based  on  those  involved  in  the  financial  system  seeking  out  new  
opportunities  to  create  wealth  and  growth  within  the  economy.  To  regulate  such  profit  seeking  
activities  would  be  to  stifle  the  growth  of  business  and  therefore  the  economy.  However  it  is  clear  
that  these  bubbles  do  need  to  be  monitored  by  regulatory  bodies  as  they  are  becoming  more  and  
more  frequent5.  Although  which  ever  form  this  regulation  takes,  it  is  unlikely  to  stop  bankers  
creating  new  profitable  products  and  therefore  creating  bubbles. 
 
When  the  industry  was  founded  in  the  coffee  houses,  there  was  more  credibility  given  to  
gentleman’s  agreements,  there  was  trust  that  these  individuals  would  be  honourable  to  each  other  
and  to  the  people  they  were  doing  business  with.  This  was  where  the  first  forms  of  regulation  were  
instilled,  not  through  any  official  forms  of  legislation  or  rules  but  through  a  concept  known  as  ‘club  
governance’.  This  was  considered  a  form  of  self-governance  amongst  the  lenders  of  the  time,  it  
relied  heavily  on  the  belief  that  they  all  belonged  to  a  form  of  ‘club’.  This  is  especially  the  case  as  
the  only  form  of  supervision  came  from  the  Bank  of  England,  who  held  the  capacity  of  lender  of  
last  resort,  as  it  still  does  to  this  day.  Within  this  ‘club’  there  was  an  expectation  that  they  would  
all  conform  to  a  series  of  norms  and  adherence  to  a  particular  culture  otherwise  they  would  be  
excluded.  This  fear  of  exclusion  was  enough  to  ensure  that  all  members  acted  in  a  way  that  was  
deemed  acceptable  by  the  whole.  The  culture  within  this  club  even  extended  to  crises,  the  most  
notable  example  of  this  is  the  Barings  crisis  of  1890,  when  it  was  decided  that  ‘a  four-year  
syndicate  of  banks,  led  by  the  Bank  of  England,  would  ratably  share  any  loss  from  Baring’s  
liquidation’6.  This  culture  of  reputation  and  trust  in  each  other  meant  that  all  banks  were  prepared  
to  shoulder  some  responsibility,  in  the  event  of  the  failure  of  one.  This  is  because  they  knew  the  
others  would  do  the  same  for  them,  if  the  situation  were  reversed.  The  added  exclusivity  seems  to  
give  weight  to  this  ‘carrot  and  stick’  approach  which  appears  to  have  been  adopted.  The  fear  of  
being  removed  is  supplemented  by  the  rewards  of  being  involved,  becoming  a  very  effective  form  
of  regulation.  As  it  was  very  much  a  case  of  looking  after  each  other  to  ensure  the  survival  of  the  
industry.  It  could  be  said  that  this  attitude  is  still  a  part  of  the  industry  today,  although  many  would  
believe  that  the  banks  do  not  hold  the  same  honourable  intentions  as  they  once  did.  Considering  
the  last  bail  out  came  through  tax  payer’s  money  rather  than  that  of  each  other.  The  perception  
previously,  was  one  of  highly  educated  men  doing  deals  which  would  advance  a  fledgling  economy.  
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However  this  opinion  seems  to  have  gone,  as  since  the  financial  crisis  the  public  views  bankers  
and  other  financial  professionals  as  little  more  than  criminals,  meaning  that  the  honour  the  
profession  was  founded  on  has  been  destroyed  by  the  actions  of  those  within  the  industry.   As  an  
industry  which  was  founded  on  gentleman's  agreements,  trust  should  be  important  to  the  industry,  
but  as  they  grew  it  became  clear  they  lost  the  principles  on  which  they  were  founded.  There  has  
been  a  massive  shift  in  the  way  that  London  Stock  Exchange  is  perceived,  even  it’s  motto  ‘dictum  
meum  pactum’,  ‘my  word  is  my  bond’7  seems  to  no  longer  be  the  case.  The  public  seems  to  have  
this  attitude  that  rather  than  honour  amongst  gentleman,  there  is  now  honour  amongst  thieves  as  
they  do  all  they  can  to  protect  each  other  from  harm. 
 
This  crash  had  caused  what  everyone  had  thought  was  impossible,  a  systemic  collapse  throughout  
the  industry.  Which  has  led  to  the  first  run  on  a  UK  bank  in  150  years,  as  Northern  Rock  was  
forced  to  approach  the  Bank  of  England  as  lender  of  last  resort,  causing  panic  amongst  the  public  
that  their  deposits  would  be  frozen.  It  was  only  during  the  beginnings  of  the  financial  crisis  that  it  
became  clear  that  many  banks  had  debt  on  their  books  far  exceeding  the  amount  of  capital  that  
held  as  security.  The  prevailing  regulation  at  the  time  was  set  out  by  the  Basel  committee,  which  
aimed  to  set  out  a  more  advanced  approach  to  how  banks  handled  risk8.  The  three  main  pillars  of  
this  international  regulatory  standard  are;  minimum  capital  requirements,  a  new  supervisory  process  
and  the  concept  of  market  discipline.  However  this  proved  ineffective  as  even  they  ‘failed  to  foresee  
the  need  that  arose  in  August  2007  for  large  capital  buffers’9.  As  this  was  the  prevailing  
international  guide  to  financial  regulation  it  is  difficult  to  see  how  domestic  regulatory  bodies  could  
implement  this  themselves.   
 
This  has  led  to  further  attempts  by  the  Government  to  regulate  the  industry  through  Acts  of  
Parliament,  codes  of  conduct  and  various  rules.  The  first  such  domestic  supervision  came  with  the  
Banking  Act  of  1979,  which  had  the  aim  ‘to  regulate  the  acceptance  of  deposits  in  the  course  of  a  
business;  to  confer  functions  on  the  Bank  of  England  with  respect  to  the  control  of  institutions  
carrying  on  deposit-taking  businesses;  to  give  further  protection  to  persons  who  are  depositors  with  
such  institutions’10.  It  seems  that  there  was  the  belief  that  the  Bank  of  England  was  best  placed  to  
regulate  the  industry,  this  being  because  they  had  the  most  experience  and  expertise  in  the  
industry.  Although  there  could  be  a  conflict  in  this,  as  the  Bank  of  England  is  the  lender  of  last  
resort,  this  is  regardless  of  how  a  bank  has  conducted  itself.  Therefore  there  could  have  been  
conflict  between  providing  assistance  to  banks  who  have  not  acted  in  ways  the  Bank  of  England  
                                                 
7 London Stock Exchange Group, ‘Our Word is Our Bond’, <https://www.lseg.com/resources/perspectives-global-markets/our-word-our-
bond> 
8 Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, ‘Consultative Document: Operational Risk’, January 2001 
<https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca07.pdf> 
9 A. Greenspan, ‘We Need a Better Cushion Against Risk’, Financial Times, 26th March 2009, <https://www.ft.com/content/9c158a92-
1a3c-11de-9f91-0000779fd2ac> 
10 Preamble, Banking Act 1979 
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had  advised.  This  proved  not  to  be  the  case  as  the  Bank  of  England  was  criticised  for  it’s  lack  of  
action  over  the  collapse  of  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International  in  the  Bingham  report11.   
 
The  most  notable  change  in  the  regulatory  landscape  came  with  the  creation  of  the  Financial  
Services  Authority12  (henceforth  known  as  the  FSA).  In  1997  with  the  incoming  of  a  new  
Government,  financial  policy  and  regulation  was  to  be  turned  on  its  head  with  the  creation  of  this  
new  regulatory  body.  At  the  time  the  new  Government  devised  a  set  of  fiscal  rules  by  which  they  
would  also  abide,  the  ’Golden  Rule’  for  Government  budgets,  being  one  of  them.  That  ‘over  the  
economic  cycle,  the  Government  will  borrow  only  to  invest  and  not  to  fund  current  spending’13.  This  
became  the  beginning  of  enhanced  regulation  in  the  financial  system  as  all  three  areas,  the  Bank  
of  England,  the  newly  created  FSA  and  the  Government  itself,  had  become  bound  by  these  overly  
prescriptive,  precise  rules,  to  which  they  must  adhere.  This  was  the  beginning  of  the  new  tripartite  
system  which  came  to  regulate  the  financial  industry  up  to  and  through  the  financial  crisis.  the  
creation  of  this  new  body  removed  the  power  of  the  Bank  of  England  to  implement  and  regulate  
financial  policy,  as  it  had  previously  been  considered  inadequate.  The  Bank  of  England  now  had  
the  power  to  set  interest  rates  and  had  become  responsible  for  monetary  policy.  It  was  believed  
that  it  was  important  to  split  all  three  of  these  areas,  as  the  assumption  was  that  each  could  
regulate  based  in  their  specific  area  of  expertise.  Although  this  seems  to  be  a  contradiction  as  the  
area  of  expertise  held  by  the  Bank  of  England  was  moved  to  the  FSA,  meaning  that  this  was  only  
implemented  on  principle  to  appear  as  if  they  were  correcting  the  failures  of  the  Bank  of  England  
which  had  come  to  light  after  the  collapse  of  the  Bank  of  Credit  and  Commerce  International.  Also  
as  it  came  to  be  seen  during  the  financial  crisis  these  areas  need  to  be  regulated  as  one,  this  is  
due  to  their  links  throughout  the  financial  system.  Having  a  lax  attitude  regarding  the  regulation  of  
monetary  policy  encourages  borrowing  due  to  the  interest  rate  falling  and  reducing  the  price  of  
debt.  As  debt  becomes  cheaper  many  people  choose  to  use  it  to  buy  assets  which  it  comes  to  
light  they  cannot  afford,  as  the  interest  rate  rises  again.  Which  is  the  fundamentals  of  how  the  
subprime  mortgage  market  collapsed.  This  targeted  heavy  regulation  being  implemented  by  the  
Government  seemed  to  suggest  that  there  was  no  longer  any  trust  that  the  Bank  of  England  was  
able  to  fulfil  its  previous  role  as  the  regulator  of  debt  levels  within  the  economy  and  became  solely  
focused  on  targeting  inflation.  Even  though  this  was  still  very  much  its  expertise  as  before  the  
financial  crisis,  Marvin  King  noted  that  ‘a  potentially  large  social  problem,  with  many  households  
getting  into  difficulty  with  their  debts, [was] materialising’14.   
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It  is  only  with  hindsight  that  we  have  come  to  see  the  importance  of  these  areas  being  regulated  
together  in  an  interlinking  fashion.  Fiscal  and  financial  policy  cannot  be  regulated  without  a  view  
towards  monetary  policy.  To  have  these  areas  regulated  independently,  by  bodies  who  did  not  
interact  with  each  other,  created  a  piecemeal  regulatory  framework  in  which  loopholes  were  taken  
advantage  of  and  the  banks  were  allowed  to  conduct  business  how  they  saw  fit.  There  were  those  
who  foresaw  the  issues  this  new  regulatory  system  was  creating,  it  was  believed  that  if  a  crisis  
were  to  happen,  there  would  not  be  one  body  who  was  able  take  charge  and  navigate  the  industry  
through  the  tough  times  a  crisis  entails.  The  main  aim  of  this  new  system  was  to  create  ‘close  and  
regular  contact  between  the  FSA  and  the  Bank,  who  maintain  a  programme  of  secondments  
between  the  two  institutions,  to  strengthen  the  links  and  foster  a  culture  of  co-operation’15,  however  
with  hindsight  we  can  see  that  this  is  not  to  case.  In  order  for  this  close  co-operation  to  happen  
there  would  need  to  be  the  desire  to  share  information  that  would  help  with  the  regulatory  process.  
Given  that  this  new  system  was  predominately  focused  on  rules,  there  was  no  need  to  advance  
practical  knowledge  within  the  FSA. 
 
After  the  financial  crash  in  2008  criticism  of  this  tripartite  system  started  to  surface,  most  notably  
from  Sir  James  Sassoon,  who  published  a  report  in  200916  citing  these  issues.  This  report  
highlighted  the  four  main  failings  of  this  new  system;  inadequate  prudential  regulation,  a  lack  of  
expertise  and  preparation  for  a  possible  crisis,  a  lack  of  appropriate  tools  to  mitigate  emerging  
risks,  and  finally  the  poor  evaluation  of  and  response  to  possible  threats  to  the  stability  of  the  
financial  sector.  Fundamentally  this  has  shown  that  despite  a  heavy  approach  to  regulation,  there  
was  still  massive  failures  when  it  came  to  regulating  the  industry.  Though  it  should  be  noted  that  
this  report,  may  have  adopted  such  strong  wording  as  it  was  published  by  the  Conservative  Party  
who  were  the  official  opposition  at  the  time.  They  would  have  had  an  obvious  political  benefit  from  
this  report  as  it  focused  mainly  on  the  failures  of  the  tripartite  system. 
 
One  of  the  biggest  failings  made  by  regulatory  bodies  was  their  unwillingness  to  use  discretion.  It  
would  appear  that  there  is  such  a  desire  to  rigidly  stick  to  the  rules  which  have  been  laid  out  that  
they  are  no  longer  able  to  fully  exercise  the  powers  which  they  do  have.  The  ways  in  which  a    
regularity  body  can  be  successful  is  by  forging  relationships  with  the  institutions  which  they  preside  
over,  however  this  has  not  been  the  case.  There  is  an  argument  against  such  a  close  bond,  that  
these  bodies  could  become  subject  to  regulatory  capture,  but  it  is  trust  which  is  needed  when  it  
comes  to  sharing  information,  especially  when  this  concerns  any  activities  which  can  have  a  
detrimental  effect  on  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Discretion  and  the  belief  that  banks  and  regulators  
could  work  together  soon  became  an  outdated  idea.  It  was  believed  that  this  could  not  have  
worked,  given  that  there  were  several  collapses  since  the  creation  of  the  sector  and  the  days  of  
‘club  governance’.  Complex  rules  and  codes  of  conduct  became  the  norm  within  the  industry  as  
                                                 
15 Her Majesty’s Treasury, ’Memorandum of Understanding between HM Treasury, the Bank of England and the Financial Services 
Authority’, The National Archives, 22nd March 2006, Archived on 13th October 2008 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20081013114121/http:/www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/6210.htm> 
16 J. Sassoon, ‘The Tripartite Review Preliminary Report’, House of Commons, 2009  
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previously  seen  with  the  rapid  expansion  of  regulation  is  in  the  latter  half  of  the  20th  Century  and  
the  beginning  of  the  21st. 
 
The  attitude  of  the  industry,  can  be  seen  in  the  response  to  audits,  the  option  of  those  carried  out  
by  the  Bank  of  England,  is  clear  to  see  in  an  interview  given  by  former  banker  Sajid  Javid;   
‘With  the  Bank  [of  England]  you  knew  that  the  regulators  were  reporting  to  people  somewhere  
who  have  relationships  with  banks,  with  clients,  and  know  the  markets.  With  emerging  markets,  
sovereign  borrowers  for  instance  the  Bank  of  England  could  be  on  the  phone  to  the  central  
bank  of  that  country  the  next  day,  to  check  up  on  you.  They  might  well  know  them,  and  have  
a  relationship  with  them.  So  when  you  open  up  your  books  to  show  the  risks,  you  knew  they  
knew  what  they  were  looking  for’17. 
This  sense  that  there  was  always  somebody  who  could  check  what  you  were  doing,  meant  that  
people  were  less  likely  to  engage  in  any  underhand  or  risky  behaviour.  It  seems  that  this  was  lost  
when  these  powers  were  transferred  over  to  the  FSA,  as  they  were  a  newer  and  more  
inexperienced  body,  it  would  seem  that  the  industry  knew  they  could  take  advantage  of  this.  The  
purpose  of  an  audit  became  more  of  a  ‘box  ticking’  exercise  as  the  officials  from  the  FSA  did  not  
seek  context  of  examples  of  the  answers  which  were  given  by  the  banks.  This  new  method  of  
regulation  had  become  very  black  and  white,  which  did  not  consider  any  of  the  numerous  shades  
of  grey  within  the  industry.  In  the  eyes  of  the  FSA,  a  bank  was  either  complaint  or  they  weren’t.  
Regulators  became  more  focused  with  what  the  rule  book  prescribed  that  when  it  came  to  the  
collapse  of  the  financial  system,  nobody  knew  what  to  do,  as  the  FSA  rule  book  did  not  give  
specific  instructions  on  how  to  handle  a  crisis.  When  times  were  good  in  the  financial  system  
nobody  seemed  to  mind  that  the  FSA  did  not  have  the  ability  to  think  of  a  course  of  action  based  
on  unfolding  events,  as  their  judgment  had  been  eroded  through  prescriptive  regulation.  In  this  new  
system  of  heavy  regulation  it  was  impossible  for  the  newest  regulator  to  gain  the  practical  
knowledge  needed,  as  they  did  not  have  the  opportunity  to  gain  any.  This  only  came  to  light,  and  
therefore  became  a  problem  when  the  crisis  hit,  by  which  time  it  was  too  late  to  gain  the  
knowledge  required  to  successfully  navigate  the  financial  industry  through  this  time.  A  system  which  
had  been  created  to  give  a  very  clear  formula  for  the  working  of  the  economy  and  be  
unambiguous,  seemed  to  provide  the  opposite  during  the  financial  crisis.  This  rule  book  became  
useless  and  as  the  regulator  was  unable  to  act,  panic  ensued  within  the  public,  leading  to  the  
much  publicised  run  on  Northern  Rock  as  depositors  did  not  want  their  savings  to  be  put  at  risk  in  
this  unchartered  territory. 
 
While  this  newly  formed  body  had  no  expertise,  outside  any  of  it’s  predetermined  rules,  it  was  still  
able  to  see  that  problems  were  beginning  to  surface  in  the  economy.  The  FSA  saw  that  ‘while  
volatility  remain[ed]  at  recent  historic  lows,  the  factors  that  have  contributed  to  it  (such  as  widely  
available,  cheap  funding  and  high  risk  appetite)  could  quickly  reverse,  potentially  resulting  in  a  
deterioration  of  global  financial  market  conditions’18.  With  the  FSA  foreseeing  this  problem  it  raises  
                                                 
17 Interview conducted with Sajid Javid for: M. Hancock & N. Zahawi, ’Masters of Nothing’, Biteback Publishing, September 2011 
18 Financial Services Authority, ‘Financial Risk Outlook’, 2007 
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the  question  of  why  they  were  unable  to  put  a  stop  to  this  before  the  financial  crisis  took  hold.  
Perhaps  this  would  be  because  they  saw  it  as  outside  of  their  remit,  due  to  it  not  being  in  breach  
of  any  of  the  prescribed  rules.  The  main  problem  with  this  form  of  heavily  prescriptive  regulation  is  
that  it  allows  no  room  for  discussion  or  debate  within  the  industry.  It  does  not  allow  for  regulators  
to  decide  the  best  course  of  action,  or  to  correct  any  failures  which  may  have  occurred  in  the  
regulatory  framework.  It  is  very  difficult  to  have  a  more  principle  based  system  of  regulation  when  
the  regulator  is  purely  focused  on  the  rules  which  have  been  set  out  before  it  by  the  Government.  
The  contradiction  is  that  this  heavy  regulation,  implemented  before  the  crisis  began,  was  criticised.  
Yet  post  the  financial  crisis  the  system  seems  to  have  only  become  regulated  further,  the  answer  
to  failures  in  over  regulation  surely  could  not  be  more  regulation. 
 
It  is  interesting  that  whilst  the  regulation  took  a  distinctively  prescribed  approach,  the  FSA’s  rule  
book  set  out  the  principles  that  a  bank  should  act  with  ‘integrity’  and  ‘conduct  business  with  due  
skill,  care  and  diligence’19.  It  appeared  as  though  these  principles  are  founded  loosely  on  morals,  
they  try  to  set  out  how  a  bank  should  act  but  not  are  not  necessarily  reflective  of  how  they  do  
act.  It  is  difficult  to  impose  these  on  banks  as,  to  conduct  their  business in  a  moral  way,  is  not  
their  main  focus,  it  is  one  in  which  they  maximise  profits  for  investors  and  shareholders.  Rather  
than  regulating  the  actual  behaviour  of  banks  it  seems  that  they  are  trying  to  impose  a  standard  
on  banks.  It  is  unlikely  that  this  is  ever  going  to  work,  as  you  cannot  prescribe  new  codes  and  
expect  an  institution  to  change  it’s  internal  culture  over  night.  With  the  culture  of  an  institution  
being  ingrained  at  its  founding  this  cannot  be  altered  through  policy  change  alone. Especially as  
employees  are  expected  to  act  in  a  way  which  supports  and  fosters  this  culture.  It  would  also  be  
detrimental  to  business  if  they  were  to  change  their  views  and  culture  with  every  change  in  the  
regulatory  framework.  With  the  banks  having  this  view  imposing  a  moral  standard  would  have  no  
effect  on  how  they  conduct  themselves,  in  order  for  these  principles  to  be  effective  they  need  to  
be  believed  and  adhered  to  by  the  banks,  which  is  not  the  case.  Whilst  the  very  nature  of  
regulation  is  to  prescribe  rules  as  to  how  an  institution  acts,  it  seems  that  much  more  progress 
could  be  made  if  the  regulator  tried  to  align  regulation  with  the  already  ingrained  principles  of  the  
industry. 
 
This  discourse  can  be  seen  by  the  way  that  banks  continually  look  to  exploit  the  loopholes  in  the  
regulatory  framework.  Regulation  has  become  so  heavily  prescribed  that  they  are  actively  seeing  to  
unbind  themselves.  This  cannot  be  an  effective  system.  For  regulation  to  be  effective  it  must  control  
illegal  behaviours  but  still  allow  businesses  to  flourish  and  create  value  as  this  is  essential  for  the  
whole  of  the  economy.  The  best  response  to  these  banks  seeking  to  exploit  gaps  in  regulation  is  
to  have  adaptable  solutions  at  the  time  these  gaps  are  found,  however,  again  this  would  require  a  
regulator  who  is  knowledgeable  in  the  area  and  able  to  use  the  discretion  they  have  picked  up  to  
adapt  to  these  situations.  Once  again  it  was  this  form  of  heavily  prescribed  regulation  that  stopped  
the  regulator  having  the  ability  to  do  this  in  these  areas,  as  they  simply  did  not  have  the  
knowledge  outside  of  the  rules  they  had  been  given.  This  even  came  down  the  schedules  which  
                                                 
19 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FCA Handbook’, 1st April 2013 
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banks  were  due  to  be  assessed  on,  Northern  Rock  was  assessed  in January  2006  and  not  due  to  
be assessed  again until  January  200920,  this  was  stuck  to  by  the  regulator  despite  the  signs  of  
failure  showing  before  this  time.  They  were  not  willing  to  act  on  their  own  intuition  in  any  way,  
even  if  it  would  have  meant  possibly  spotting  the  signs  of  an  impending  crisis. 
 
This  strict  adherence  to  the  rules  meant  that  when  it  came  to  the  2007  financial  crash  the  system  
as  a  whole  failed,  but  yet  none  of  the  banks  involved  broke  any  rules.  This  could  not  have  been  
further  away  from  the  true  purpose  the  FSA  was  created  for.  Whilst  the  FSA  was  the  regulator  at  
the  time  of  the  financial  crash,  it  could  be  said  that  it  was  the  Bank  of  England  who  guided  the  
industry  through  the  most  turbulent  times.  The  history  and  weight  this  institution  held  was  
considered  far  more  important  than  anything  else.  Even  through  this  new  regulatory  system  had  
been  imposed  the  industry  still  sought  comfort  in  its  roots  at  the  time  of  crisis.  This  would  make  it  
seem  that  regulations  are  unimportant  to  the  industry,  more  of  a  hindrance,  as  they  return  to  their  
historic  institutions  in  these  times,  even  if  the  Government  believes  them  to  be  inadequate.  During  
the  financial  crisis  the  industry  did  not  need  rules,  they  needed  guidance,  after  all  this  was  a  
situation  nobody  had  envisioned  happening.  This  was  a  time  when  history  and  expertise  mattered  
more  than  being  correct  or  compliant.   As  we  can  see  from  the  financial  crisis  this  level  of  heavy  
regulation  does  not  necessarily  stop  banks  from  behaving  in  ways  that  they  shouldn’t.  What  it  does  
is  remove  any  common  sense  aspect  from  the  regulators  decision  making  process,  it  encourages  a  
culture  of  looking  over  flaws,  because  as  long  as  the  boxes  are  ticked  and  the  numbers  add  up  
nothing  else  matters,  the  actions  which  cause  crises  go  unchecked. 
 
The  rules  which  had  been  set  out  became  so  narrow  that  the  focus  of  the  regulator  had  shifted  
from  that  of  overseeing  the  entire  system  to  only  being  concerned  with  the  internal  operations  of  
the  banks  themselves.  Key  clues  to  the  impending  financial  crisis  had  been  missed  all  because  of  
this  narrow  prescriptive  approach.  The  belief  that  the  market  can  regulate  and  look  after  itself  
seems  to  have  been  lost  as  it  is  slowly  being  suffocated  by  regulations  which  could  hamper  
business  and  growth  throughout  the  industry.  Many  in  the  industry  would  believe  that  it  is  enough  
for  them  to  learn  from  their  mistakes  and  allow  them  to  forge  a  path  to  a  more  secure  future.  It  
appears  that  this  is  not  likely  to  happen  as  the  Government  needs  to  appear  as  though  it  is  
correcting  these  mistakes  and  not  ignoring  the  failures  of  the  banks.  Clearly,  the  Government  has  
over  regulated  in  order  to  appear  as  though  it  is  acting  in  the  wake  of  this  disaster.  The  
importance  of  appearing  to  not  allow  this  kind  of  crisis  to  happen  again  is  incredibly  important  to  
the  Government  as  their  perception  by  the  public  is  everything,  after  all  their  employment  relies  
upon  it.  However  it  could  be  said  that  this  over  regulation  has  not  had  an  effect  on  the  financial  
industry  as  there  are  still  claims  of  irresponsible  lending  by  businesses,  it  may  not  be  the  banks  
specifically  but  in  other  areas21.  This  is  concerning  as  it  once  again  raises  the  problems  of  allowing  
debt  to  grow,  possibly  forming  another  bubble,  which  could  have  the  same  effects  as  the  subprime  
                                                 
20 The House of Commons Treasury Select Committee, ‘The Run on the Rock’, Firth Report of Session 2007-2008,  Volume 1, 24th 
January 2008 
21 K. Peachey, ‘Debt-Laden targeted by Credit Card Firms’, 30th August 2017, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/business-41082034> 
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mortgage  bible  as  people  are  unable  to  pay  off  these  debts.  Whether  the  system  chooses  to  under  
or  over  regulate  it  seems  to  suggest  that  the  financial  industry  will  continue  to  seek  ways  to  create  
profit  for  themselves.  Such  revelations  also  have  a  negative  impact  on  the  way  the  industry  is  seen  
by  the  public.  
 
It  has  become  clear  that  with  each  collapse  of  a  banking  institution  more  regulation  has  been  
introduced,  the  regulatory  system  is  acting  retrospectively,  trying  to  correct  the  poor  behaviour  which  
led  to  the  failure  of  the  institution.  Whilst  you  cannot  regulate  for  the  future  and  problems  of  which  
you  are  not  yet  aware,  it  is  difficult  to  understand  how  we  can  expect  change  when  we  are  now  
disapproving  of  behaviour  which  was  acceptable  at  the  time.  The  implementation  of  this  heavy  
regulation  could  lead  to  resentment  within  the  industry,  it  would  appear  as  though  they  are  being  
punished  despite  not  breaking  any  laws  and  doing  exactly  as  the  rules  required  them  to  do.  It  is  
therefore  understandable  that  there  are  so  many  clashes  between  the  industry  and  the  public.  The  
financial  crisis  caused  the  public  to  start  taking  note  of  the  financial  industry’s  behaviour.  Many  in  
the  public  find  it  difficult  to  understand  that  these  crashes  continually  happen  within  the  financial  
industry.  The  crisis  is  nothing  new,  however  it  is  new  that  these  collapses  have  such  an  effect  on  
the  public. 
 
Whilst  there  was  the  imposition  of  a  new  regulatory  structure  before  the  financial  crisis  it  seems  
that  the  majority  of  the  regulation  has  come  after.  It  would  appear  that  this  is  mainly  to  appease  
the  public,  further  cementing  the  opinion  that  the  Government  are  doing  something  about  the  
malpractice  which  was  the  cause  of  so  many  issues  with  the  financial  system.  The  flurry  of  
legislation  began  with  the  Banking  Act  2009  and  the  Financial  Services  Act  2010.  The  dates  these  
Acts  were  published,  one  and  two  years  after  the  financial  crash  took  hold,  would  suggest  that  
these  were  knee  jerk  reactions.  It  would  lead  many  to  believe  that  these  were  not  thoroughly  
thought  through  and  weren't  necessarily  in  the  best  interests  of  the  industry,  who  were  struggling  to  
navigate  the  issues  of  the  time  and  stay  afloat. 
 
The  piece  of  legislation  which  had  the  most  profound  effect  on  the  regulatory  system  was  the  
Financial  Services  Act  2012,  as  this  removed  the  FSA  and  created  two  new  regulatory  bodies  who  
would  take  over  from  it,  the  Financial  Conduct  Authority22  (henceforth  known  as  the  FCA)  and  the  
Prudential  Regulation  Authority23  (henceforth  known  as  the  PRA).  The  failures  of  the  FSA  had  been  
deemed  too  large  to  justify  its  continued  existence,  once  again  meaning  uncertainty  for  the  financial  
sector  as  regulation  was  being  turned  on  its  head.  Whilst  there  is  a  significant  change  in  powers  
for  these  new  institutions  it  seems  rather  important  to  notice  the  change  in  name,  from  security  to  
conduct.  It  could  be  the  case  that  security  no  longer  became  plausible  due  to  the  security  of  the  
whole  economy  being  put  at  risk  under  the  FSA’s  watch.  Not  just  in  the  United  Kingdom  but  
across  the  globe  as  these  supposedly  ‘secure’  products  were  traded  worldwide,  with  the  regulator  
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 Part 1A, Chapter 1, Financial Services Act 2012 
23 Part 1A, Chapter 2, Financial Services Act 2012 
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ensuring  their  ‘security’,  considering  security  is  ‘the  state  of  being  free  from  danger  or  threat’24.  This  
in  contrast  to  conduct,  which  relates  more  to  ‘the  manner  in  which  a  person  behaves, especially  in  
a  particular  place  or  situation’25.  This  relates  directly  to  what  many  people  saw  as  the  greatest  
failure  of  the  financial  crisis.  That  many  of  these  bankers  were  allowed  to  act  how  they  wished  
without  any  adequate  thought  of  the  consequences  as  they  had,  on  paper,  done  everything  by  the  
rules.  This  was  an  obvious  shift  as  the  focus  was  to  try  and  correct  the  malpractice  within  the  
industry.  However  it  could  be  said  that  this  change  is  not  all  that it  seems  as  the  Act  states  ‘the  
body  corporate  previously  known  as  the  Financial  Services  Authority  is  renamed  as  the  Financial  
Conduct  Authority’26.  This  would  imply  that  in  reality  there  is  no  change  in  the  body  only  its  name.  
It  would  not  inspire  confidence  that  the  failings  of  the  FSA  would  not  be  repeated  by  the  FCA,  
which  can  hamper  public  confidence  in  the  system. 
 
The  creation  of  these  many  Acts  of  Parliament  and  the  new  regulatory  bodies  have  undoubtedly  
caused  confusion  within  the  industry.  The  economy  and  banks  thrive  in  climates  of  certainty,  whilst  
a  heavily  regulated  system  could  do  this  through  the  intuitions  knowing  which  obligations  they  are  
bound  to.  It  is  likely  to  defeat  the  object,  as  constant  changes  or  additions  do  not  give  the  banks  
enough  time  to  adequately  implement  the  changes  in  regulation.  It  is  difficult  to  equate  the  failures  
of  the  tripartite  system  of  regulation,  due  to  there  being  too  many  bodies  who  concentrate  on  their  
own specific  areas,  to  the  regulatory  landscape  in  which  we  now  find  ourselves  with  significantly  
more  regulation  and  more  regulatory  bodies.  Therefore  it  is  rather  confusing  that  the  heavily 
prescriptive  regulation  was  used  before  the  financial  crisis  and  seen  to  be  inadequate  due  to  its  
nature  of  being  too  rigid. Yet  since  the  financial  crisis  the  Governments  of  the  world  have  become  
more  and  more  rigid  and  prescriptive  in  their  regulation. 
 
Whilst  there  is  a  regulatory  framework  laid  out  for  banks,  there  is  much  to  be  said  for  the  internal  
systems  of  regulation  within  banks,  this  effective  internal  regulation  comes  from  corporate  
governance.  This  is  mainly  focused  towards  the  internal  ‘checks  and  balances’  of  the  banks  as  
‘corporate  governance  involves  a  set  of  relationships  between  a  company’s  management,  its  board,  
its  shareholders  and  other  stakeholders.  Corporate  governance  also  provides  the  structure  through  
which  the  objectives  of  the  company  are  set,  and  the  means  of  attaining  those  objectives  and  
monitoring  performance  are  determined.  Good  corporate  governance  should  provide  proper  incentives  
for  the  board  and  management  to  pursue  objectives  that  are  in  the  interests  of  the  company  and  
its  shareholders,  and  should  facilitate  effective  monitoring”27.  This  definition  leaves  little  room  for  the  
opinions  of  the  public,  but  as  they  have  effectively  become  shareholders  since  the  financial  crisis,  
as  the  bail  out  should  be  considered  an  ‘investment’  in  the  stability  of  the  economy’,  therefore  it  
could  now  apply  to  them.  It  could  be  said  that  corporate  governance  is  the  system  which  the  
banks  consider  to  be  most  important,  as  this  is  aligning  the  regulatory  framework  with  the  
objections  of  the  institution  in  a  suitable  way.  This  allows  a  bank  the  freedom  to  conduct  their  
                                                 
24 Oxford English Dictionary, Oxford University Press, 2017 
25 Ibid 
26 Part 1A, Chapter 1, s1A (1), Financial Services Act 2012 
27 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘Principles of Corporate Governance’, Paris: OECD, 2004  
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business  how  they  see  fit  and  maximise  profits,  whist  still  acting  in  a  way  the  regulator  deems  
acceptable.  
 
Corporate  governance  becomes  more  important  when  you  consider  that  banks  now  have  offices  all 
over  the  globe.  Therefore  they  are  subject  to  the  regulatory  structure  of  the  host  nation,  The  
Organisation  of  Economic  Co-operation  and  Development  and  any  emerging  countries  who  are  
establishing  their  systems.  This  can  create  many  regulatory  problems  for  banks  as  they  are  required  
to  establish  their  corporate  governance  policies  in  a  way  which  suits  all  of  these  requirements.  The  
complication  of  meeting  these  host  nations  requirements,  then  adding  on  the  international  standards,  
ensures  that  these  institutions  are  held  to  the  highest  possible  standard.  Whist  this  may  be  
considered  good,  as  the  regulatory  bar  is  set  higher,  it  can  lead  to  difficulty  and  confusion  within  
these  banks.  The  confusion  could  lead  to  less  effective  implementation  of  corporate  governance  as  
there  is  no  clear  criteria  the  banks  would  need  to  meet  in  order  to  be  compliant.  
 
This  system  of  internal  regulation  ensures  a  constant,  that  the  principles  of  the  bank  are  used  as  a  
standard  across  the  business,  only  minor  changes  need  to  be  made  in  order  to  comply  with  each  
host  nations  regulatory  framework.  One  way  to  end  this  confusion  would  be  to  apply  a  global  
standard  of  regulation,  although  this  would  be  incredibly  difficult  as  getting  all  countries  to  agree  
would  be  near  impossible.  There  may  also  be  an  opinion  that  larger  countries  may  try  to  impose  
their  regulatory  systems  on  less  developed  nations.  This  would  mean  that  there  was  no  longer  a  
discussion  leading  to  a  global  standard,  more  an  enforcement  of  one  system  over  another,  based  
on  political  power  rather  than  merit.  A  more  lax  approach  to  regulation  would  work  in  this  instance  
as  banks  would  have  more  freedom  to  implement  a  system  of  corporate  governance  which  suited  
their  operations.  However  banks  may  exploit  this  lax  system  in  order  to  increase  profits,  leading  to  
an  increase  in  risky  behaviour, for  example  the  actions  of  Nick  Leeson  whilst  trading  on  the  
Singapore  International  Monetary  Exchange28.  As  there  is  little  trust  in  the  financial  sector’s  ability  to  
regulate  itself  since  the  financial  crisis  it  is  unlikely  that  they  would  be  allowed  the  freedom  to  do  
so.   
 
A  lot  can  be  said  for  the  role  that  shareholders  play  in  the  decision  making  processes  of  banks,  
after  all  it  is  them  that  the  bank  works  for  and  their  decisions  at  the  annual  general  meetings  
which  shape  the  course  of  action  for  the  bank.  The  role  of  shareholders  could  be  exaggerated  as  
they  rarely  take  such  an  interest  in  the  institutions  they  hold  shares  in,  predominantly  they  trust  the  
decisions  made  by  the  board  members  and  as  long  as  they  receive  their  dividends  they  do  not    
concern  themselves  with  the  day  to  day  running  of  the  bank.  Therefore,  fundamentally,  it  is  the  
board  who  shapes  the  governance  of  the  institution  as  no  matter  how  much  the  regulator  chooses  
to  intervene,  ‘ultimately,  it  is  the  responsibility  of  the  leaders  of  the  financial  institutions  - not  their  
regulators,  shareholders  or  other  stake  holders  -  to  create,  oversee,  and  imbue  their  organisations  
                                                 
28 A. Beattie, ‘How Did Derivatives Trader Nick Leeson Contribute to the Fall of Barings Bank?’, Investopedia, Published on Date 
Unknown, <http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/08/nick-leeson-barings-bank.asp> 
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with  an  enlightened  culture  based  on  professionalism  and  integrity’29.  Whilst  this  is  a  noble  aim  it  
appears  that  the  industry  is  yet  to  act  with  the  integrity.  This  system  of  checks  and  balances  
seems  rather  redundant  as  the  shareholders  are  ineffective,  due  to  their  inability  to  carry  out  this  
duty  to  the  full  extent  that  they  should. 
 
One  area  in  which  corporate  governance  can  help  regulation  is  when  institutions  have  a  systemic  
risk.  This  refers  to  ‘the  risk  of  an  adverse  change  in  the  financial  system  as  a  whole,  which  would  
affect  all  markets  and  asset  classes’30,  in  the  event  of  an  institutions  failure.  One  of  the  main  
regulatory  changes  to  come  out  of  the  financial  crisis  is  that  it  has  now  become  the  case  that  we  
require  financial  institutions  to  plan  for  their  failure.  The  internal  corporate  governance  is  responsible  
for  these  living  wills,  which  are  ‘detailed  plans  that  would  enable  these  lenders  to  stipulate  in  
advance  how  they  would  raise  funds  in  a  crisis  and  how  their  operations  could  be  dismantled  after  
a  collapse’31.  The  hope  behind  the  creation  of  these  living  wills,  it  that  a  repeat  of  the  panic  at  the  
collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  would  not  occur,  as  banks  would  no  longer  leave  mass  uncertainty  in  
the  event  of  their  failure.  As  institutions  are  now  global  in  their  nature  it  is  important  that  there  
would  be  a  distinct  plan  at  how  to  wind  down  a  failing  institution,  which  would  mean  certainty  
across  these  boarders.  This  may  sound  rather  morbid  to  plan  for  the  failure  of  the  institution  you  
manage,  but  this  is  the  way  institutions  stop  themselves  from  having  a  major  systemic  impact,  
which  can  cause  the  whole  economy  to  suffer,   in  the  event  of  their  failure.   
 
One  of  the  most  drastic  but  also  conclusive  ways  to  correct  the  malpractice  of  bankers  is  through  
the  use  of  fear.  Fear  can  be  incredibly  useful  in  regulating  the  behaviour  of  people  and  does  not  
need  to  be  in  an  overly  threatening  way.  This  is  something  that  regulators  could  being  to  
implement.  If  bankers  believe  that  there  will  be  a  harsh  punishment  for  any  malpractice,  then  they  
are  less  likely  to  conduct  those  practices.  There  will  always  be  exceptions  to  the  rule,  but  in  the  
majority  of  cases,  it  will  stem  the  kind  of  behaviour  which  leads  to  economic  crises.  However  this  
would  be  considered  one  of  the  harshest  forms  of  regulations,  to  control  someone’s  behaviour  
through  fear  of  extreme  punishment.  In  the  eyes  of  the  general  public  this  may  seem  to  be  
justified  if  it  were  to  stop  the  malpractice  which  had  come  to  be  so  common.  If  this  form  of  
regulation  were  to  be  implemented  then  it  would  be  a  considerable  jump  for  the  industry,  as  in  
reality,  those  actions  which  we  now  consider  to  be  malpractice  within  the  financial  industry,  were  
not  actually  wrong  at  the  time.  In  the  case  of  the  behaviour  which  led  to  the  financial  crisis  wrong  
does  not  always  mean  illegal,  immoral  certainly,  but  there  were  no  regulations  to  ensure  a  
company  acted  in  a  moral  way.  Therefore  to  criminalise  what  is  considered  acceptable  behaviour  
within  the  financial  industry  would  be  incredibly  harsh.  Most  likely  it  would  lead  to  swift  changes  in  
how  the  banks  operate,  it  would  not  necessarily  have  an  impact  on  the  culture  of  banks  
themselves.  Rather  it  may  create  a  culture  of  resentment  within  the  industry  that  they  are  now  
being  villainised.  It  is  clear  that  the  reputation  of  bankers  has  been  brought  down  in  the  eyes  of  
                                                 
29 Numerous Signatories, ‘Financial Leaders Pledge Excellence and Integrity’, Financial Times, 28th September 2008 
<https://www.ft.com/content/eb26484e-cb2d-11df-95c0-00144feab49a> 
30
 The Financial Times, ‘Lexicon’, Published on Date Unknown, <http://lexicon.ft.com/Term?term=systemic-risk> 
31 The Financial Times, ‘Lexicon’, Published on Date Unknown, <http://lexicon.ft.com/term?term=living-will> 
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the  public,  meaning  that  bankers  do  not  value  themselves  in  the  way  that  they  once  did.  This  can  
have  a detrimental  outcome  on  our  economy  as  there is  no  incentive  for  them  to  produce  wealth  for  
a  country  they  do  not  believe  values  their  ability  to  make  wealth.  It  is  also  important  to  note  that  
the  regulatory  climate  is  not  in  the  position  that  it  once  was  to  facilitate  this  ability. 
 
This  can  also  be  the  case  with  the  ‘pain  of  remembered  loss,  a  term  coined  by  J.K.  Galbraith,  
who  wrote  about  the  financial  stability  of  the  post  war  United  States,  ‘as  a  protection  against  
financial  illusions  or  insanity,  memory  is  far  better  than  law.  When  the  memory  of  the  1929  disaster  
failed,  law  and  regulation  no  longer  sufficed’32.  This  would  give  the  impression  that  regulation  is  
very  much  unimportant  to  the  actions  of  those  within  the  financial  industry,  as  it  is  remembering  the  
fear  and  the  public  backlash  at  times  of  crisis  that  forces  people  to  change  their  ways  and  act  in  
a  more  moral  way,  which  would  lead  to  the  stability  of  the  economy  and  not  one  which  only  
serves  self.  This  is  something  that  no  amount  of  regulation  can  create,  it  cannot  keep  banks  and  
their  workers  in  a  perpetual  state  of  fear  of  these  memories.  It  can  create  a  fear  of  consequence  
but  not  force  institutions  into  remembering  the  previous  crisis,  even  public  memory  does  not  span  
so  far.  These  memories  and  the  fear  of  the  panic  which  ensued  will  slowly  be  forgotten,  this  may  
even  speed  up  as  people  who  have  no  recollection  of  these  events  enter  the  industry.  Whilst  the  
banks  are  still  not  trusted  institutions  it  has  not  stopped  anyone  from  depositing  money  with  them  
or  investing  in  the  economy. 
 
It  is  clear  that  there  needs  to  be  a  form  of  fear  in  the  regulatory  framework,  perhaps  this  should  
be  related  to  those  concepts  that  are  most  related  to  their  business,  negative  value.  This  is  a  
situation  where  the  average  loss  is  greater  than  the  average  gain,  when  all  probable  outcomes  
have  been  taken  into  account,  it  is  clear  that  ‘insufficient  fear  can  produce  non  maximising  
behaviour  when  risky  options  have  negative  value’33.  Once  again  confirming  that  it  is  individual  
perception  to  their  own  actions  which  is  most  likely  to  sway  their  decisions,  not  that  of  enforced  
regulation.  A  person  needs  to  believe  that  there  will  be  a  consequence  to  their  action,  one  strong  
enough  to  dissuade  them  from  continuing,  regulation  is  yet  to  come  up  with  such  a  concept.  
 
The  financial  industry  has  been  the  centre  of  a  culture  of  bravado,  with  many  only  focusing  on  
who  can  make  the  most  money,  with  bonuses  becoming  the  measure  of  status  and  success  in  the  
workplace.   Before  the  financial  crisis  there  was  a  perception  of  bankers,  as  fearless  and  above  all  
others.  Sir  Fred  Goodwin,  CEO  of  Royal  Bank  of  Scotland  Group  (henceforth  known  as  RBS),  
seemed  to  be  the  epitome  of  the  archetypal  banker,  as  it  was  said  ‘he  treated  anyone  who  had  a  
different  view  from  his  own  with  contempt’34.  Status  and  pay  are  therefore  intrinsically  linked,  giving  
anyone  who  worked  within  the  industry  their  sense  of  self-worth.  This  link  can  become  toxic  for  the  
industry  as  many  will  seek  out  those  ways  in  which  they  can  make  the  most  money,  in  order  to  
                                                 
32
 J.K. Galbraith, ‘The Great Crash 1929’, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1955 
33 C. Camerer, G. Lowenstein & D. Pralec, ‘Neuroeconomics: How Neuroscience can Inform Economics’, Journal of Economic 
Literature, Volume XLIII, March 2005 
34 I. Fraser, ‘Fred’s Downfall: Hubris Followed by Nemesis’, 20th October 2008 <https://www.ianfraser.org/freds-downfall-hubris-
followed-by-nemesis/> 
 15 
improve  their  status  in  the  bank.  Therefore  it  is  unlikely  that  they  would  have  any  concern  for  
those  whose  money  they  are  handling,  this  is  purely  an  exercise  in  self-promotion.  Once  again  this  
shows  that  the  vast  sums  of  money  they  dealt  with  were  only  numbers  and  therefore  valueless.   
 
This  belief  in  money  having  little  or  no  value  is  supposed  by  the  concept  of  moral  hazard,  as  this  
concept  suggests  that  people  will  act  more  recklessly  is  they  are  not  fully  exposed  to  the  risks.  
The  concept  was  first  used  in  the  insurance  industry  as  it  is  believed  that  more  people  would  act  
recklessly  if  their  possessions  were  insured,  for  example,  if  a  person’s  car  is  insured  they  are  more  
likely  to  leave  it  parked  on  the  street  rather  than  locked  in  a  garage,  as  they  will  not lose  out  if  it  
is  stolen.  This  is  very  much  the  case  in  the  financial  industry  as  they  are  trading  with  others’  
money  and  not  their  own.  Bankers  would  be  more  likely  to  assess  risk  adequately  and  thoroughly  if  
it  were  their  own  money  they  were  using  to  trade.   There  is  no  connection  between  the  banker  to  
the  end  investor  and  therefore  this  moral  connection  or  sense  of  duty  towards  them,  is  removed.  
This  was  reinforced  through  previous  regulators  actions  towards  the  banks,  in  the  United  States  for  
example,  Alan  Greenspan  intervened  numerous  times  when  he  was  the  Chairman  of  the  Federal  
Reserve.  On  several  occasions  he  cut  interest  rates  in  order  to  stabilise  the  American  economy  and  
stimulate  growth  after  crises,  such  as  the  Asian  crash  and  the  bursting  of  the  dot-com  bubble.  
There  then  became  an  over  reliance  on  the  Federal  Reserve,  as  not  only  those  in  the  United  
States  but  around  the  world  as  they  believed  that  the  Reserve  would  protect  them  in  the  event  of  
a  possible  failure  but  also  stand  back  and  allow  growth  to  flourish.  This  belief  is  mostly  founded  on  
the  principle  that  the  market  can  regulate  itself  and  that  all  those  in  the  industry  acting  in  the  best  
interests  in  the  preservation  and  growth  of  the  financial  system,  which  we  have  seen  is  not  always  
the  case.  Whilst  this  attitude  of  a  financial  safety  net  allowed  those  working  in  the  markets  to  
believe  they  were  always  protected  several  economists  began  to  see  that  this  was  ‘not  so  much  
“irrational  exuberance”  as  exaggerated  faith  in  the  stabilising  power  of  Mr.  Greenspan  and  the  
Fed’35.  This  over  reliance  on  the  Federal  Reserve  was  to  make  the  collapse  of  Lehman  Brothers  all  
the  more  shocking  for  the  industry,  when  the  decision  not  to  bail  out  the  bank  was  made.  Perhaps  
this  was  the  regulators  way  of  trying  to  combat  moral  hazard  which  had  so  obviously  built  up  in  
the  industry,  as  the  US  Treasury  Secretary,  Hank  Paulson,  said  at  the  time  that  letting  Lehman  
Brothers  fail  was  a  ‘badge  of  honour’36,  however  with  the  aftermath  that  ensued  this  could  not  be  
further  from  the  truth.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
35 M. Miller, P. Weller, and L. Zhang, “Moral Hazard and the US Stock Market: Analysing the “Greenspan Put””, The Economic Journal, 
Volume 112, Issue 478, March 2002 
36 A. Seldon, G. Lodge, ‘Brown at 10’, Biteback Publishing, November 2011  
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This  view  of  moral  hazard  meant  that  regulation  really  has  no  power,  this  is  due  to  the  belief  that  
whether  banks  abide  by  the  rules  which  have  been  laid  out  or  not,  they  will  still  be  rescued  by  the  
regulator  through  taxpayers  money.  This  is  even  more  the  case  than  before,  despite  the  Federal  
Reserve’s  belief  in  letting  Lehman  Brothers  fall  being  in  best  interests  of  the  financial  industry,  it  
has  led  to  many  more  institutions  across  the  globe  being  bailed  out  by  their  respective  
Governments.  In  this  backwards  result  of  their  original  intention  they  have  reaffirmed  this  moral  
hazard  and  the  belief  that  they  will  be  saved  as  they  are  ‘too  big  to  fail’.  As  ‘the  financial  sector  
that  is  emerging  from  the  crisis  is  even  more  riddled  with  moral  hazard  than  the  one  that  went  into  
it’37,  meaning  that  the  decision  to  let  Lehman  Brothers  fall  did  not  have  the  desired  effect  on  the  
industry.  Once  again  proving  that  regulation  is  a  small  determining  factor  in  the  views  and  actions  
of  the  financial  industry.  Which  can  be  seen  most  predominantly  in  the  slow  build  up  to  the  
financial  crisis. 
 
This  belief  of  money  being  valueless  or  not  seemingly  real  is  seen  in  a  2010  study  by  Rüdiger 
Fahlenbrach  and  René  Stulz,  which  found  that  CEOs  with  the  largest  shares  in  their  banks  were  
the  worst  hit  during  the  crisis,  for  example  Dick  Fuld  held  Lehman  Brothers  stock  worth  $1 billion38.  
Many  would  believe  that  share  ownership  would  have  a  restraining  factor  on  risky  behaviour  within  
banks,  although  this  has  not  been  the  case.  Due  to  the  nature  of  this  money  being  intangible  there  
is  no  need  act  safely  with  it.  Further  illustrating  the  belief  that  this  money  holds  no  value,  unlike  
the  bonuses  we  have  come  to  expect  within  the  financial  sector.  Once  this  money  is  translated  into  
a  bonus  and  deposited  into  a  bank  account,  it  becomes  real,  perhaps  this  is  the  way  to  best  instil  
a  belief  that  there  are  repercussions  to  failed  actions.  This  can  be  seen  once  again  by  looking  to  
Sir  Fred  Goodwin,  who  became  one  of  the  most  notable  figures  in  the  2008  financial  crisis,  as  he  
presided  over  the  failure  of  RBS,  which  had  to  be  rescued  by  the  tax  payer.  Whilst  this  has  led  to  
the  financial  suffering  of  many,  it  appears  that  he  has  not  suffered  any  personal  loss  for  his  
actions,  considering  the  pension  he  was  due  to  receive  totalled  £703,000  per  year,  only  to  be  
gradually  reduced  due  to  a  series  of  public  revelations39.  This  shows  that  for  those  working  in  the  
financial  industry,  even  when  they  preside  over  the  most  notable  collapse  of  a  bank,  they  are  still  
able  to  leave  without  any  consequence.  To  many  in  the  public  it  seems  that  the  bonus  and  pay  
structure  will  still  reward  employees  within  banks  even  if  they  fail.  It  could  be  said  that  this  links  
into  the  belief  that  some  banks  are  ‘too  big  to  fail’  as  the  individuals  at  these  banks  know  that  
they  will  always  be  rescued,  due  to  the  systemic  risk  of  their  failure.  This  would  further  reinstate  
the  belief  that  they  are  invincible  and  may have  helped  to  develop  this  sense  of  fearlessness. 
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Even  after  the  financial  crisis  it  was  said  that  the  bonus  structures  would  be  reformed  and  this  
attitude  to  rewards  regardless  of  performance  would  be  removed.  However  this  was  not  the  case,  
as late  as  2010  pay  was  not  being  linked  to  any  form  of  performance  indicator  such  as  share  price  
and  continued  as  it  did  before  the  crisis.  There  has  been  much  speculation  about  the  possibility  of  
a  bonus  claw  back  scheme40,  which  would  see  the  bonuses  of  banker  retracted  if  they  made  ‘a  
material  failure  of  risk  management  or  misconduct’.  This  could  prove  to  be  an  effective  course  of  
regulation  as  it  would  instil  a  sense  of  fear,  that  the  money  could  be  retrieved  for  a  period  up  to  
six  years.  Therefore  it  would  mean  losing  something  for  malpractice  and  creating  a  consequence.  
This  would  show  that  the  banker  at  fault  has  also  suffered  personally  for  the  loss  they  have  
caused.  However  it  could  be  seen  that  is  this  a  particularly  harsh  method  and  could  potentially  lead  
to  some  individuals  being  used  as  scape  goats  for  a  whole  institution.  It  has  become  clear  that  
there  is  a  need  for  these  individuals  to  have  suffered  some  personal  loss  for  their  actions,  after  all  
‘not  only  must  justice  be  done;  it  must  also  be  seen  to  be  done’41.  This  can  easily  be  seen  in  the  
political  sphere,  if  a  politician  acts  in  a  way  contrary  to  how  society  expects,  or  implements  a  
policy  which  is  unfavourable  then  they  are  not  voted  back  in  during  the  next  election,  this  then  
becomes  a  form  of  constant  accountability.  However  it  would  be  difficult  to  say  there  should  be  
constant  accountability  to  the  public  in  the  financial  industry  as  they  are  not  voted  into  their  
positions  or  paid  by  the  public.  It  would  be  no  way  for  the  industry  to  operate,  but  the  common  
consensus  is  that  there  needs  to  be  a  form  of  accountability  with  the  regulatory  framework. 
 
This  change  should  be  implemented  within  the  financial  system  because  the  way  bonuses  are  
currently  structured  seems  opposite  to  how  the  financial  system  operates.  Currently  bonuses  are  
focused  on  short  term  targets  such  as  sales,  this  would  mean  that  bankers  during  the  financial  
crisis  would  have  previously  received  their  remuneration  based  on  how  many  of  the  subprime  
mortgage  bonds  they  sold  to  investors,  rather  than  how  well  they  performed  overall.  Meaning  that  
their  bonuses  are  linked  to  the  number  of products  they  sell  rather  than  the  return  on  investment,  it  
is  clear  that  the  financial  industry  is  not  purely  focused  on  sales.  There  should  be  a  more  long  
term  view  to  remuneration  which  links  the  sales  of  their  products  to  their  overall  performance.  It 
seems  counter  intuitive  to  reward  a  banker  for  selling  a  product  which  causes  a  loss  to  the 
investor,  as  the  investor  is  losing  money  and  therefore  unlikely  to  invest  more  in  the  future.  
Although  some  would  argue  that  a  banker  does  not  work  for  an  investor  but  for  the  bank,  and  
therefore  should  be  rewarded  for  the  profits  he  brings  into  the  institution.  However  given  current  
mis-selling  this  can  no  longer  be  seen  as  acceptable,  as  not  only  have  the  sales  of  these  products  
brought  losses  to  the  investors  but  they  have  also  brought  about  the  collapse  of  the  financial  
industry.  Remuneration  schemes  of  many  banks  also  focus  very  much  on  individual  performance,  
rather  than  the  performance  of  the  institution  as  a  whole.  Remuneration  may  be  an  effective  
constraint  if  the  packages  are  linked  to  the  performance  of  the  products  they  sell  rather  than  how  
many  they  sell.  A  lack  of  connection  between  bonuses  and  performance  can  cause  great  anger  
                                                 
40 The Bank of England, ‘News Release - Bank of England Consults on Bonus Clawback’, Published on Date Unknown, 
<http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/publications/Pages/news/2014/053.aspx> 
41 R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy, [1924] 1 KB 256 
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amongst  shareholders  as  they  see  their  dividends  fall,  whilst  senior  members  of  the  banks  staff  
continue  to  take  home  large  bonuses  and  pension  packages  at  the  end  of  their  tenure,  despite  
posting  continuous  losses.  In  order  for  trust  to  be  brought  back  into  the  financial  industry  it  must  
be  seen  that  there  is  no  longer  a  reward  for  management  failures. 
 
It  would  have  been  unlikely  that  the  bankers,  who  worked  at  these  large  institutions,  would  have  
believed  they  had  a  duty  to  the  public.  There  is  no  obvious  connection  to  them  because  bankers  
had  come  to  see  themselves  as  more  than  the  stereotypical  high  street  bank  manager,  which  the  
public  associates  with  the  industry.  They  had  now  moved  beyond  this  as  they  were  selling  complex  
financial  products,  in  order  to  create  mass  amounts  of  wealth  for  their  respective  institutions.  They  
began  to  see  themselves  as  more  important  and  adding  greater  value  to  the  business.  They  were  
no  longer  solely  the  custodians  of  people’s  money,  or  looking  to  invest  in  the  next  small business.  
They  began  to  see  themselves  as  grander  than  this,  becoming  the  masters  of  the  economy,  all  
because  of  the  vast  amounts  of  money  they  were  handling  and  the  rewards  systems  which  
promoted  this  attitude.  Most  fundamentally,  the  link  between  the  banks  and  the  members  of  the  
public  can  be  boiled  down  to  a  trust.  Whilst  there  is  not  the  official  steps  in  order  to  make  a  trust  
it  could  be  said  that  one  still  exists  because  the  bank  is  holding  an  asset,  in  this  case  the  
intangible  asset  of  money,  in  safety  for  another.  Through  this,  it  can  be  argued  that  a  bank  has  a  
duty  to  the  depositor  and  therefore  has  a  responsibility  towards  them. 
 
Bankers  have  never  had  the  opinion  that  they  work  for  the  public,  they  see  themselves  as  working  
for  their  investors,  although  it  could  be  said  that  this  isn't  really  the  case,  as  they  use  investor  
money  to  create  vast  revenue  for  the  investment  arm  of  banks.  Before  the  financial  crisis  there  was  
a  valid  argument  for  bankers  only  working  for  their  institutions  and  investors,  however  this  has  
since  changed  as  several  banks  were  bailed  out  using  taxpayers  money.  Meaning  that  the  taxpayer  
is  now  the  majority  shareholder  of  the  institution,  and  therefore  should  be  treated  as  such.  Alas  
many  bankers  still  do  not  see  themselves  as  truly  accountable  to  their  shareholders,  as  their  only  
role  is  to  create  wealth,  not  act in  the  best  interests  of  everyone  who  holds  shares  in  the  banks.  It  
is  clear  that  the  financial  industry  has  a  lot  of  work  to  do  when  it  comes  to  winning  back  the  trust  
of  the  public  and  this  is  not  just  the  role  of  the  institutions  themselves  but  also  the  regulators  who  
are  supposed  to  oversee  their  behaviour.  A  free  market  can  only  be  successful  if  there  is  trust  and  
it  is  clear  that  this  is  no  longer  the  case.  There  needs  to  be  a  drastic  change  in  the  financial  
system,  which  cannot  be  done  through  regulation  alone.  The  public  has  shifted  their  view  on  
capitalism  and  its  overall  benefits  since  the  financial  crisis  of  2008,  the  attitudes  are  fickle  at  best,  
when  the  system  works  and  people  are  making  money  then  they  trust  the  system  and  wilfully 
ignore  the  risks.  Yet  when  the  system  collapses  they  seek  a  scape  goat  or  want  to  change  the 
fundamentals  of  the  economy.  This  financial  crisis  was  not  one  that  just  had  an  effect  on  the  
United  States  and  the  United  Kingdom,  but  countries  and  economies  across  the  globe.  The  trust  
which  the  public  had  in  the  financial  industry  has  been  lost  through  this  desire  for  the  financial  
system  to  exploit  the  use  of  complex  terminology  and  confusing  nature  of  the  products  they  were  
selling.  This  tactic  of  creating  money  through  complex  and  confusing  means  has  been  found  out  
and  therefore  public  confidence  in  the  system  has  been  shattered.  The  public  can  no  longer  trust  
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that  their  bank  is  looking  after  their  best  interests  or  their  money  effectively,  as  it  has  come  to  light  
that  they  have  been  lured  into  purchasing  mis-sold  products,  for  example  the  recent  Payment  
Protection  Insurance  scandal.  This  is  far  after  the  initial  shock  of  the  2008  financial  crash,  yet  more  
of  this  behaviour  is  still  being  found  out.  Further  denting  public  confidence  in  the  financial  system,  
it  seems  that  just  when  attitudes  are  finally  beginning  to  change  and  confidence  to  slowly  come  
back  another  scandal  emerges,  akin  to  taking  one  step  forward  and  two  steps  back.  
 
This  is  no  way  for  the  financial  industry  to  operate,  in  order  for  workers  to  be  at  their  most  
productive,  they  need  to  feel  that  what  they  are  doing  is  valuable  and  have  a  societal  benefit.  
Bankers  no  longer  believe  this  and  therefore  their  productivity  and  profitability  suffers.  This  again  
has  an  impact  on  the  economy  as  a  whole  as  it  stifles  growth.  The  public  lack  of  confidence  in  
the  banks  and  the  financial  industry  is  having  a  detrimental  effect  on  their  own  pockets  as  the 
economy  cannot  perform  as  it  should.  This  becomes  a  vicious  circle  as  the  economy  stays  
repressed,  for  which  the  public  blames  financial  professionals,  leading  to  an  even  more  stagnant  
economy. 
 
It  could  be  said  that  there  may  already  be  an  opinion  held  by  the  public  that  the  banks  have  a 
responsibility  towards  them.  A  responsibility  to  not  have  allowed  them  to  borrow  so  much  whist  debt  
was  so  cheap  knowing  that  they  would  not  be  able  to  pay  it  back  in  the  event  of  interest  rate  
rises.  However  this  argument  seems  rather  flawed,  as  a  bank  is  not  in  the  position  to  ensure  that  
every  customer  is  making  a sound  financial  decision, after  all  this  is  what  accountants  and  other  
financial  advisors  are  for.  Since  the  tax  payer  bail  out  of  collapsing  banks,  there  is  still  the  view  
that  they  do  not  need to  repay  any  of  this  debt.  If  this  has  not  been  seen  since  the  financial  crisis  
where  taxpayer  money  was  used  to  save  their  institutions  it  is  unclear  what  would  have  to  happen  
for  them  to  believe  this.  There  seems  to  be  a  culture  clash  between  that  of  the  financial  industry  
and  that  of  the  public.  The  public  appears  to  want  to  be  respected  and  pandered  to  as  they  see  
themselves  as  the ‘saviours’  of  the  financial  system.  Whereas  the  banks  do  not,  as  seen  previously  
they  already  have  a  belief  that  without  them  the  economy  would  not  have  grown  to  such  enormous  
heights,  and  created  such  wealth  which  led  to  the  good  times  which  happened  before  the  crisis.  
There  will always  be  a  clash  as  each  expects  to  be  respected  for  what  they  have  put  into  the  
industry,  yet  they  are  both  unwilling  to.  No  amount  of  regulation  can  regain  this  trust  in  the  
financial  system,  whether  this  is  harsh  or  lax.  There  needs  to  be  a  shift  within  the  sector  where  
bankers  believe  they  have  a  social  responsibility  and  therefore  act  as  such,  and  for  the  public  to  
not  become  too  involved  in  the  financial  system.  
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One  regulatory  change  which  must  take  place  is  based  on  institutions  which  have  a systemic  risk.  
Any  bank,  whose  collapse  could  be  considered  a  risk  to  the  entire  economic  system,  must  view  its  
risk  in  this  way.  The  board  on  that  institution  cannot  purely  see  itself  as  one  entity,  this  must  
consider  the  risk  they  would  have  throughout  the  whole  system  and  implement  a  system  of  
corporate  governance  which  would  account  for  this.  The  idea  of  implementing  a  governance  policy  
with  the  view  of  looking  after  others,  may  not  appeal  to  many  within  the  industry  but  it  is  
necessary  to  ensure  that  a  global  collapse  does  not  happen  again.  It  would  also  take  the  financial  
institutions  back  to  the  days  of  coffee  houses,  with  the  belief  that  they  were  all  looking  out  for  one  
another,  and  help  each  other  if  there  was  the  dire  need.  Restoring  confidence  in  each  other  and  
giving  the  public  a  sense  that  they  were  prepared  for  any  eventuality,  and  able  to  call  on  each  
other  in  the  event  of  a  crisis  and  not  the  Government  or  the  taxpayer. 
 
The  change  within  the  regulatory  system  of  the  FSA  being  removed  and  the  FCA  being  created  
could  ease  the  problems.  Yet  it  is  difficult  to  say  how  this  could  be  achieved  when  in  reality  the  
same  people  and  departments  are  being  incorporated  into  the  new  institution.  Is  it  really  the  case  
that  there  can  be  a  new  culture  within  an  institution  which  houses  the  same  individuals  who  
oversaw  the  previous  crisis?  Culture  is  not  changed  through  rebranding  and  moving  offices,  it  is  
done  through  introducing  and  implementing  new  ideas  and  core  values. It  is  yet  to  be  seen  if  this  
change  in  regulatory  body  has  any  effect,  and  unfortunately  can  only  be  judged  by  another  financial  
crisis,  by  which  time  if  the  change  is  not  effective  then  it  is  too  late. 
 
It  is  clear  now  that  financial  institutions,  most  predominately  the  banks  have  a  responsibility  to  the  
public  and  the  economy  as  a  whole.  Even  though  this  is  commonly  dismissed,  not  just  by  those  
within  the  financial  industry  but  also  those  teaching  it.  In  institutions  today  there  are  lecturers  who  
challenge  the  idea  that  the  financial  industry  has  any  role  in  public  responsibility  and  protecting  
society  for  their  own  behaviour.  This  is  understandable  as,  like  all  people,  those  individuals  don’t  
like  to  have  their  thoughts  and  beliefs  challenged.  Fundamentally  the  only  way  we  can  change  the  
culture  within  the  financial  industry, banks  in  particular,  is  through  education.  To  change  the  industry  
and  it’s  attitude  to  recent  behaviour,  through  educating  the  next  generation  of  bankers  and  financial  
professionals.  As  much  as  governments  wish  the  alter  the  actions  of  the  industry  through  regulation,  
change  cannot  come  swiftly  using  this  method.  Mainly  because  peoples’  actions  are  not  changed  
through  the  use  of  rules   or  the  law.  This  can  be  seen  in  any  other  area  of  human  nature,  just  
because  we  have  a  law  forbidding  murder,  does  not  mean  that  people  do  not  commit  it.  We  need  
to  establish  a  cultural  shift  within  the  financial  industry,  that  this  reckless  behaviour  founded  upon  
an  individual’s  own  greed  is  wrong.  That  these  beliefs  should  be  removed  before  the  reputation  of  
the  industry  is  tarnished  to  a  point  where  it  cannot  be  redeemed  and  the  economy  of  the  world  is  
once  again  put  in  jeopardy.  
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